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CONSUME OR INVEST: WHAT DO/SHOULD AGENCY
LEADERS MAXIMIZE?
William E. Kovacic* & David A. Hyman**
Abstract: In the regulatory state, agency leaders face a fundamental choice: should they
“consume,” or should they “invest”? “Consume” means launching high profile cases and
rulemaking projects. “Invest” means developing and nurturing the necessary infrastructure
for the agency to handle whatever the future may bring. The former brings headlines, while
the latter will be completely ignored. Unsurprisingly, consumption is routinely prioritized,
and investment is deferred, downgraded, or overlooked entirely. This Article outlines the
incentives for agency leadership to behave in this way and explores the resulting agency
costs (pun intended). The U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s health care portfolio provides a
useful case study of how one agency managed and minimized these costs. Our Article
concludes with several proposals that should help encourage agency leadership to strike a
better balance between consumption and investment.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 296
I. THE NEED FOR INVESTMENT ................................................. 298
II. THE SIRENS OF CONSUMPTION ............................................. 304
III. A CASE STUDY OF BALANCED INVESTMENT AND
CONSUMPTION ........................................................................... 313
A. Setting Goals and Designing a Strategy to Achieve Them .. 315
B. Capability and Capacity Enhancements ............................... 316
C. Retrospective Evaluation...................................................... 317
IV. STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN
CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT....................................... 318
A. Create a Pro-Investment Norm ............................................. 318
B. Investment Budgets .............................................................. 320
C. Setting Priorities and Approving Projects ............................ 320
D. Ex Post Evaluation ............................................................... 321
V. A FEW COMPLICATIONS .......................................................... 322
A. Striking the Proper Balance.................................................. 322
B. Does It Matter Whether Agency Leadership Is a Plank* Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University Law School
and Non-Executive Director, United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority. From 2006 to
2011, the author served as a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and chaired the
agency from March 2008 to March 2009. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.
** H. Ross and Helen Workman Chair in Law and Professor of Medicine, University of Illinois.
From 2001 to 2004, he served as Special Counsel at the FTC.

295

15 - Kovacic Hyman.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/27/2016 3:36 PM

296

[Vol. 91:295

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Owner or a Successor-in-Interest? ....................................... 322
C. Agency Leadership Versus Agency Personnel .................... 323
D. Operationalizing the Framework .......................................... 323
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 324

INTRODUCTION
“[P]art of public service is planting trees under whose shade you’ll
never sit . . . .”1
In the management cliché hall of fame, the all-time winner is pick the
“low hanging fruit.”2 Of course, obtaining high-value results with a
minimum of effort is excellent advice, at least as a starting point. But, as
a general principle, the message is extremely short sighted. Unless
leaders plant trees, there will be neither shade nor fruit for future
generations to enjoy.
The conflict between picking and planting—between consuming and
investing—is a policy perennial. Good leaders know that any success
they may achieve depends on the investment decisions made by their
predecessors. In like fashion, good leaders also know that many of the
benefits of any investment they make will be captured by their
successors.
Agency leaders are not angels.3 They are human beings, who desire
personal recognition and advancement. Investment in institutional
capability and capacity does not result in newspaper headlines, popular
acclaim, or the offer of a high-paying private sector job. Instead, it is the
announcement of a “big” case or rulemaking that casts agency leadership
in a positive light.
If there is no turnover in agency leadership this dynamic would not
1. Hillary Clinton Transcript, Building the ‘Growth and Fairness Economy,’ WALL ST. J. (July
13, 2015, 12:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/07/13/hillary-clinton-transcript-buildingthe-growth-and-fairness-economy/ [https://perma.cc/946P-R7LL].
2. Lucy Kinder, Office Jargon: The Worst Culprits in Management Speak, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 21,
2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jobs/10393668/Office-jargon-The-worstculprits-in-management-speak.html [https://perma.cc/EUE2-PRLL].
3. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961) (“If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people
is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions.”).
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create a major problem: “[w]hen agency leadership does not change, the
leaders capture the benefits (and bear[] the costs) of the outcomes in the
cases that they initiate.”4 But agency leadership is never indefinite.
Indeed, in most of the administrative state, political appointees come and
go quite frequently.5 A timely departure makes it possible for agency
leaders to “‘outrun their mistakes,’ so that when blame-time arrives, the
burden will fall on someone else.”6 In practice, this means that agency
leaders have a significant incentive to launch big cases or rulemaking
without being overly concerned about the agency’s capability and
capacity to deliver the goods.7 Stated more concretely, agency leaders
will predictably and systematically slight investment and prioritize
consumption. I.B.G.-Y.B.G. (“I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone”) does not
apply only to Wall Street.8
4. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? Judging the
FTC’s Critics, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1948, 1973 n.151 (2015).
5. PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 316–
17 (2014) (“A study of presidential appointees . . . found an overall median tenure of only 2.5 years;
one quarter of them served more than 3.6 years while another quarter served for less than eighteen
months.”).
6. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 4, at 1973 n.151 (quoting ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES:
THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 90 (1988)). King and Crewe study the behavior of cabinet
ministers and other senior officials in the United Kingdom, and reach the same conclusion:
The sheer passage of time may also result in non-accountability. By the time the Thatcher
government’s exciting new personal pensions had been mis-sold on a vast scale, the relevant
ministers and probably most of their senior officials had long since passed on. It would have
been almost impossible to hold any of them to account . . . . [T]he relationship in British
politics between, on the one hand, long-term success and failure and, on the other, personal
triumph and disgrace is all but non-existent. Most blunderers, however gross their blunders, go
unpunished.
ANTHONY KING & IVOR CREWE, THE BLUNDERS OF OUR GOVERNMENTS 354, 359 (2014).
7. Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 166
(2005) (“An agency head garners great attention by beginning ‘bold’ initiatives and suing big
companies. When the bill comes due for the hard work of turning initiatives into successful
regulation and proving big cases in court, these agency heads are often gone from the public stage.
Their successors are left either to trim excessive proposals or even to default, with possible damage
to agency reputation. The departed agency heads, if anyone in the Washington establishment now
cares about their views, can always blame failure on faulty implementation by their successors.”).
8. Eric Dash, What’s Really Wrong with Wall Street Pay, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Sept. 18,
2009, 2:31 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/whats-really-wrong-with-wallstreet-pay/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3YSF-5H6H] (“A major cause of the current crisis will most
likely prove to be a mismatch of incentives for Wall Street traders. If a mortgage trader made a big
bet, he had the chance to land a big bonus if it paid off (and his boss did, too). If, however, that bet
didn’t pan out — and the trader lost a lot of money for the firm — he might receive no bonus at all.
On the contrary, he might get a princely severance package. But one thing seems pretty clear: That
trader would not receive a ‘negative bonus.’ In other words, he did not personally incur the cost of
the trading blowup. Indeed, the open secret on Wall Street was that traders did not risk losing their
own money — just the chance of receiving an enormous payout. Economists call this a moral
hazard problem. In bankerspeak, it’s known as the ‘I.B.G.-Y.B.G.’ issue — as in ‘I’ll Be Gone and
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Building on our previous work,9 we show the importance of balancing
consumption against investment. We focus on the policy mismatches
that arise when short-term political appointees lead governmental
agencies with long-term policy needs—but our analysis also applies to
private and nonprofit firms. We also discuss measures that can serve to
counteract inadequate attention to investment. The Federal Trade
Commission’s (FTC) health care program illustrates the importance and
benefits of sustained investments in capability.
Part I describes how investments in agency capability provide the
necessary foundation on which an agency builds successful cases, rules,
and other policy initiatives. Part II examines the structural and political
incentives that encourage agency leadership to systematically privilege
consumption over investment. Part III provides a case study of the
FTC’s health care portfolio, where investments in policy research and
development (R&D) have played a critical role in generating policy
success. Part IV identifies a few modest strategies that might encourage
the prioritization of investment by agency leaders. Part V addresses
objections that might be raised against a rebalancing of consumption and
investment.
I.

THE NEED FOR INVESTMENT

In this Article, we focus on agencies similar to the FTC, but the
framework we describe applies to many governmental agencies.
You’ll Be Gone’ if the trade goes south.”).
The same dynamic has been noted in international development projects:
When those who design development projects and get them approved by relevant authorities,
move on, get promoted, and are not held accountable for results, is that not a case of you’ll be
gone and I’ll be gone? If you are not going to be held accountable for implementation and
results you don’t have to worry about whether or not the project will produce results under real
world conditions. You can cut and paste global best practice on a technical issue into projects
to be implemented in vastly different environments. Job done. When implementation
challenges inevitably arise and hold things up, well, that is somebody else’s problem. For the
design team it is a case of “I’ll be gone and you’ll be gone.”
Sina Odugbemi, I’ll Be Gone and You’ll Be Gone, WORLD BANK: PEOPLE, SPACES, DELIBERATION
(Sept.
23,
2009),
http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/ill-be-gone-and-youll-be-gone
[https://perma.cc/VT88-S9R2].
9. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 4; David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional
Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163 (2013)
[hereinafter Hyman & Kovacic, Institutional Design]; David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why
Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1446 (2014) [hereinafter Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance]; William E. Kovacic & David
A. Hyman, Competition Agency Design: What’s on the Menu?, 8 EUR. COMPETITION J. 527 (2012);
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agencies with Complex Policy Portfolios:
Divide or Conquer? 33, 42, in COMPETITION LAW ON THE GLOBAL STAGE (Nicolas Charbit & Elisa
Ramundo eds., 2014) [hereinafter Hyman & Kovacic, Divide or Conquer].
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Regulatory agencies, like the FTC, have a wide variety of policy
instruments at their disposal.10 A regulatory agency can prosecute cases,
promulgate rules, conduct studies, issue reports, convene public
consultations, issue guidelines, and have agency personnel give
speeches. To apply these tools effectively, the agency must do three
things well: it must understand the behavior it observes; it must decide
whether the behavior is sufficiently problematic to justify intervention;
and it must then choose among the various alternative solutions.
Competent performance of these three tasks requires substantial
institutional capability and capacity—and expert performance requires
substantially more than that.11 Developing the necessary capability and
capacity requires an agency to invest effectively in five distinct domains:
hiring personnel, developing administrative infrastructure, building
depth and currency of substantive knowledge, establishing internal
decision-making procedures, and engaging effectively with other
organizations and leaders.
The first investment domain is hiring personnel. The agency must
find, hire, and retain skilled professionals and other personnel. And,
once the personnel are hired, they must be organized into teams. For
example, the FTC has separate Bureaus for Competition, Consumer
Protection, and Economics. The Bureau of Competition and the Bureau
of Consumer Protection are staffed by lawyers; the Bureau of Economics
is staffed by economists.12 As we have noted elsewhere, “[t]he
10. For a discussion of how effective policy making often requires a wide range of instruments,
see More than Law Enforcement: The FTC’s Many Tools—A Conversation with Tim Muris and Bob
Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (2005) [hereinafter Muris/Pitofsky Conversation]; Maureen K.
Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina
Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity 11 (Mar. 31, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/634091/150403hertiagedental.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GU29-58YV] (“[O]ur state action efforts, like most of our contributions to the
development of the antitrust laws, depended on the broad use of all of our agency functions –
including research, advocacy, administrative litigation, and federal court enforcement.” (emphasis
added)).
11. “Capacity” refers to the level of human talent and supporting resources needed to carry out
the agency’s assigned functions. “Capability” refers to whether the agency has the statutory
authority, organizational structure, and quality control mechanisms needed to execute its mission
effectively. The importance of these factors is examined in Hyman & Kovacic, Agency
Performance, supra note 9; William E. Kovacic, The Digital Broadband Migration and the Federal
Trade Commission: Building the Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J.
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 1, 7 (2010); see also KING & CREWE, supra note 6, at 382–84
(identifying “skills shortages” as an important cause of governmental failure).
12. See Luke M. Froeb et al., The Economics of Organizing Economists, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 569
(2009) (describing the impact of relying on multidisciplinary teams of lawyers and economists
versus having lawyers and economists organized into separate bureaus); Hyman & Kovacic, Divide
or Conquer, supra note 9.
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government is already thickly planted with bureaus, agencies, and interagency working groups, departments and commissions”—and each has
its own internal organization designed to effectuate the statutory
mission.13
Whatever organizational configuration is chosen, a successful
operating unit will contain teams with strong analytical skills and deep
expertise in the relevant subject matter.14 Good teams prosper by reason
of their intellectual acumen and intuition, honed by repeated study of
specific problems. For example, the FTC economists and lawyers who
review mergers in the pharmaceutical industry have analyzed dozens of
transactions over the past few decades.15 They have a sophisticated
understanding of individual firms, drug research pipelines, and industry
trends. The specific individuals staffing this area have changed over
time, but the FTC pharmaceutical mergers team has sustained a good
mix of experienced managers and case handlers and newer employees
who learn from longstanding team members.
The second investment domain is developing an administrative
infrastructure (both personnel and physical facilities) to support
substantive projects. A major component of the FTC’s consumer
protection work consists of prosecuting fraudulent schemes involving
health care products and services.16 These and other antifraud initiatives
benefitted immensely from investments the FTC made in the 1990s to
build an electronic database (Consumer Sentinel) that collects and

13. Hyman & Kovacic, Divide or Conquer, supra note 9, at 28; see also Jennifer Nou, IntraAgency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015).
14. See WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100:
INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY 46–49 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_
statements/federal-trade-commission-100-our-second-century/ftc100rpt.pdf [https:// perma.cc/T9SG
-C9AB] (noting the importance of talented personnel to FTC performance).
15. MARKUS H. MEIER ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN
PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 26–64 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/rxupdate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y28J-VCE3]
(discussing FTC pharmaceutical mergers program).
16. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, All 50 States and D.C. Charge Four Cancer
Charities with Bilking Over $187 Million from Consumers (May 19, 2015),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-all-50-states-dc-charge-four-cancercharities-bilking-over [https://perma.cc/D2RE-BPEU]; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Company Touting Unproven Cancer Treatment Agrees to Settle FTC Charges (July 24, 2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/07/company-touting-unproven-cancertreatment-agrees-settle-ftc [https://perma.cc/4M3Y-KBHV]; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, No
Silver Lining for Marketers of Bogus Supplement; Federal Agencies Crack Down on Health Fraud
(June 19, 2003), http://ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2003/06/no-silver-lining-marketersbogus-supplement-federal-agencies [https://perma.cc/7M5N-B3VJ].
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analyzes complaints about alleged misconduct.17 By amassing
complaints received by the FTC and a variety of governmental and
nongovernmental partners, Consumer Sentinel enables the FTC’s
consumer protection specialists to quickly identify fraudulent scams, and
assemble the evidence necessary to initiate litigation.18 Thus, the
investment in Consumer Sentinel made it much easier for the FTC to
detect and remedy serious fraud on a real-time basis.19
The FTC has made similar investments supporting its mobile
telephony programs.20 Communications technology is one of the most
dynamic areas of commerce, and the FTC has to continuously invest to
keep up. In response, the FTC has hired technologists with expertise in
the relevant technical disciplines and established an internal “mobile
laboratory” to detect fraud in the use of mobile telephones.21
The third investment domain is building depth and currency of
substantive knowledge. As described above, one element of this
knowledge base is the accumulated experience of agency personnel, who
develop expertise in specific industries and commercial practices.22 But,
17. See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10, at 789–91 (discussing creation and operation
of Consumer Sentinel).
18. Consumer Sentinel Network, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
consumer-sentinel-network [https://perma.cc/9HWU-BHKX] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016) (describing
functions of Consumer Sentinel Network).
19. See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10, at 796–97 (describing the impact of
Consumer Sentinel).
20. On the FTC’s programs in this area, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY
DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH TRANSPARENCY (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparencyfederal-trade-commission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MT6B8T5N]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAPER, PLASTIC . . . OR MOBILE? AN FTC WORKSHOP ON MOBILE
PAYMENTS
(2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/paper-plastic-ormobile-ftc-workshop-mobile-payments/p0124908_mobile_payments_workshop_report_02-2813.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP9F-WTHN].
21. See Division of Litigation Technology & Analysis, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/divisionlitigation-technology [https://perma.cc/3BWR-322N] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016) (describing FTC’s
Mobile/Internet Lab); Joel Schectman, Q&A David Vladeck, Former Director of FTC Consumer
Unit, WALL ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Jan. 22, 2014, 3:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
riskandcompliance/2014/01/22/qa-david-vladeck-former-director-of-ftc-consumer-unit/
[https://perma.cc/3W2G-RXSW] (“We did not have technologists on staff at the time and to do
highly technical cases of the kind that we did during my [Vladeck’s] tenure there, and doing still
today, you need sophisticated forensic work. One of the things we did was bring in technologists to
have on staff. We set up a laboratory to do forensic work on mobile devices. You need to have
people who can view evidence captures on mobile devices and really understand the ecosystem
behind the screen. I think we were the first civil law enforcement agency anywhere that had a fully
functioning lab for mobile devices.”).
22. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
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an equally important source of an agency’s knowledge base consists of
investments that are the public policy equivalent of the research and
development (R&D) expenditures that a private company makes to
create new or improve existing products.23 Such policy R&D24 can take
various forms, including empirical studies of individual sectors or
commercial phenomena, research concerning the legal predicates for
future cases, hearings, and public consultations; and retrospective
assessments of completed agency initiatives.25 These measures have a
common purpose—to improve the agency’s ability to identify areas of
needed intervention, devise useful remedies, and give advice to
legislators and other government agencies. The urgency to make these
investments is especially great in sectors such as health care that feature
high levels of technological and organizational dynamism. 26 Congress
gave the FTC a diverse portfolio of policy R&D tools,27 and the
application of the complete portfolio has figured prominently in the

23. See Andrew I. Gavil, The FTC’s Study and Advocacy Authority in Its Second Century: A Look
Ahead, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1905 (2015) (discussing role of “prospective study” to
enhance FTC’s capacity to understanding emerging industry trends and practices); KOVACIC, supra
note 14, at 91–109 (describing FTC investments that increase the agency’s knowledge base).
24. This phrase originated in Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade
Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
359 (2003).
25. See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10, at 774–76 (discussing FTC policy R&D
tools); Gavil, supra note 23, at 1908–09 (same); William E. Kovacic, Measuring What Matters: The
Federal Trade Commission and Investments in Competition Policy Research and Development, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 861 (2005) (same); KOVACIC, supra note 14, at 91–109 (same).
26. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in High-Tech Industries: Improving the Federal
Antitrust Joint Venture, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1097, 1102–03 (2012). Professor Andrew Gavil,
who headed the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning from 2013 to 2015, cautions that “[a]gencies can
fall behind the times in a variety of ways. They can be caught unaware of new industry trends and
practices that impact competition as well as new academic and economic learning and analytical
methods.” Gavil, supra note 23, at 1907. He explains that “periods of economic transformation”
feature changes that “can take the form of entirely new industries, novel products or services,
evolving industry structures and new industry practices, and innovative business models facilitated
by new technologies.” Id. at 1905. He concludes that “[p]rospective study will be needed to inform
and thereby better prepare the [FTC] for both advocacy and law enforcement.” Id.; see also Farhad
Manjoo, For the New Year, Let’s Resolve to Improve Our Tech Literacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/technology/for-the-new-year-lets-resolve-to-improveour-tech-literacy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4QEM-E764] (discussing need for public policy
makers to improve ability to understand developments in fast-changing technology sectors).
27. The FTC is specifically authorized to collect information on industrial conditions and
practices and to publish studies, independent of its law enforcement efforts. 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49
(2012). Their significance is discussed in William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission as
Convenor: Developing Regulatory Policy Norms Without Litigation or Rulemaking, 13 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 17, 19 (2015).
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agency’s health care programs.28
A fourth form of investment that fosters program success is the
development of internal procedures that enable the agency to make
intelligent decisions about how to deploy its limited resources. There are
many ways that an agency can structure its internal decision-making
process.29 Good agency practice includes continuing efforts to improve
these processes to test evidence rigorously and to counteract behavioral
phenomena that might otherwise cause the agency to slight theories or
facts that should dictate a reassessment of its views.30
Finally, an agency must “play well with others.” In many fields of
regulation, policymaking duties are shared by a multiplicity of public
bodies within individual jurisdictions and across nations.31 In a world of
increasing policymaking multiplicity and fragmentation, the attainment
of good regulatory solutions requires interagency and inter-jurisdictional
engagement. Some forms of engagement take place through formal
mechanisms such as memoranda of understanding between two or more
agencies, or a network that brings together multiple agencies within a
single jurisdiction or across jurisdictions.32 Others can be highly
informal, such as regular meetings of senior managers or case handlers
from different agencies to discuss matters of common concern. These
formal and informal means of coordination and cooperation do not
happen without investment—although investment does not guarantee
that other agencies will decide to make nice.33

28. Gavil, supra note 23, at 1908–10 (describing diversified FTC policy making approach in
health care); see also Ohlhausen, supra note 10, at 8–11 (same).
29. See William E. Kovacic et al., Merger Control Procedures and Institutions: A Comparison of
EU and U.S. Practice, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 55 (2014) (comparing European Union and United
States merger control processes); supra note 12 and accompanying text.
30. James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics: Implications for Regulatory
Behavior, 41 J. REG. ECON. 41 (2012) (noting the impact of confirmation bias and other behavioral
factors on regulators).
31. Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 9, at 1480–81.
32. See Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The International Competition Network: Its
Past, Current and Future Role, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 274 (2011) (describing development of formal
networks that bring together competition agency officials to discuss matters of common concern);
Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10, at 795 (describing FTC agreements with foreign
governments to cooperate on consumer protection matters).
33. There have been periodic bitter disputes between the FTC and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) over “clearance” (i.e., which agency should handle certain types of cases); the substantive
content of a report on Section 2 of the Sherman Act; and the DOJ’s recommendation against the
granting of certiorari in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), an early
FTC reverse payment case. One of us (Kovacic) ruefully noted in an interview that despite
considerable investment by the FTC, “[w]e have an archipelago of policy-makers, with very
inadequate ferry service between the islands . . . . In too many instances, when you go to visit those
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An agency that does all of these things increases the chances of
attaining policy success. The requisite investments will seldom happen
by accident. Rather, each generation of agency leadership must make a
commitment to build institutional capability and capacity and
continuously examine whether it is investing enough and in the right
things. As we discuss more fully below, these investments are the
foundation on which good outcomes depend.
II.

THE SIRENS OF CONSUMPTION

If investment is so important, why do we think that agency leadership
routinely defers, downgrades, or overlooks it?34 The explanation is
simple: the Sirens of consumption are hard to resist.35 What agency
leader can resist the temptation of being the one to announce an
attention-grabbing intervention, such as the initiation of a case against a
major industry player, or the launch of a new rulemaking project? The
resulting press conference and favorable academic commentary provide
ready-made opportunities for credit claiming. Professional reputations
and post–public service employment opportunities will rise or fall
depending on the volume of an agency’s activity.36 Simply stated, the
initiation of cases and rulemaking projects are the readily observable
events by which agency leadership is typically judged.37
islands, the inhabitants come out with sticks and torches and try to chase you away.” Jonathan B.
Baker, Turning on Itself, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 14, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/63428/
turning-itself [https://perma.cc/N4AS-ZMTB].
34. See Muris, supra note 7.
35. William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good
Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 922 (2009) (“The perceived imperative to create new
cases can create a serious mismatch between commitments and capabilities, as the sirens of creditclaiming beckon today’s manager to overlook the costs that improvident case selection might
impose on the agency in the future, well after the incumbent manager has departed.”).
36. Consumption increases post-public service employment opportunities in two ways. First,
consumption enhances reputation directly by creating opportunities for credit-claiming. Second,
those responsible for creating a regulatory labyrinth are ideally situated to guide affected firms
through the maze—and will be handsomely compensated for doing so. In nautical terms, having
created underwater obstacles at the entry to the harbor, the former regulator then acts as the pilot
who can bring ships safely to shore. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 4 (discussing private sector
demand for former regulators who played a role in creating regulatory mechanisms).
37. See KING & CREWE, supra note 6, at 333–45 (noting “hyperactivism” of ministers in U.K.);
William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 404–05, 408–10 (2003) (describing and criticizing tendency of commentators
to use prosecution of cases as main measure of competition agency quality). Unsurprisingly, the
preeminent annual ranking of competition agencies focuses chiefly on the prosecution of cases. See
2015 Rating Enforcement—The Annual Ranking of the World’s Leading Competition Authorities, 18
GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., June 2015.
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Worse still, the temporal disconnect between launches and
(sometimes crash) landings means that agency leadership does not bear
the full cost of bad outcomes—whether the bad outcome is because the
case/rulemaking should never have been brought/initiated in the first
place, or because the case/rulemaking was worth bringing/initiating, but
failed because there was insufficient capability and capacity to
successfully handle the matter in question. Indeed, agency leadership
may not bear any of the costs if they are able to blame their successors
for the (usually unspecified) mistakes that supposedly caused a bad
outcome.38
Politics can also encourage excessive and unwise consumption. When
the price of gasoline rose sharply in the early 1970s, Congress demanded
that the FTC take action to protect independent refiners from alleged
overreaching by large, vertically-integrated petroleum companies.39 The
FTC responded in 1973 by filing the Exxon “shared monopolization”
case,40 which sought the vertical disintegration of the eight largest
petroleum refiners in the United States.41 The sprawling case was
unmanageable from the start, and FTC staff soon saw the matter as a
professional chain gang where morale and careers went to die.42 In 1981,
after eight years of pretrial discovery, the Commission dismissed the
case.43 Exxon consumed massive resources and inflicted lasting harm on
the FTC’s reputation.44

38. William E. Kovacic, Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two
Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases, 12 RES. L. &
ECON. 173, 189 (1989) (“[A] short-term perspective may incline the manager to launch headlinegrabbing initiatives with inadequate regard for the matter’s underlying merits or the ultimate cost to
the agency, in resources and reputation, in litigating the case. If the case goes badly, the manager
responsible for the take-off rarely is held to account for the crash landing. He can hope the passage
of time will dim memories of his involvement, he can blame intervening agents for their poor
execution of his good idea, or he can shrug his shoulders and say he was making the best of the
fundamentally bad situation that policymakers encounter in the nation’s capital.”); see also Muris,
supra note 7.
39. William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of
Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 637–39 (1982).
40. In re Exxon Corp., [1973–1976 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,388 (Dkt. No.
8934, July 17, 1973), complaint dismissed, 98 F.T.C. 453 (1981).
41. Id. The run-up to the case and the political pressure that inspired it are examined in Timothy
J. Muris & Bilal K. Sayyed, The Long Shadow of Standard Oil: Policy, Petroleum, and Politics at
the Federal Trade Commission, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 859–64 (2012).
42. Edward Cowan, Attorneys Quit F.T.C. Oil Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1978, at D1.
43. In re Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453, 453 (1981).
44. William E. Kovacic, Standard Oil Co v. United States and Its Influence on the Conception of
Competition Policy, 2012 COMPETITION L.J. 89 (2012) (discussing FTC’s prosecution of petroleum
industry shared monopolization case and its long-term effects on the agency). Kovacic spent two
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The same pattern recurred thirty years later, albeit with a different
outcome. The price of gasoline spiked repeatedly between 2000 and
2008, and members of Congress used a variety of techniques to induce
the FTC to take action.45 In one instance, two members of the Senate
imposed a “hold” on the nomination of Deborah Majoras to be the
agency’s chair.46 The hold was released only after the FTC opened an
investigation into Chevron’s closure of a refinery in Bakersfield,
California.47
Congress held multiple hearings, during which legislators berated
agency leaders for allowing gasoline prices to rise. Perhaps the most
striking of these legislative show-trials was the appearance of Chairman
Majoras in May 2006 before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science & Transportation to defend an FTC report on the impact of
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita on petroleum product prices.48
The report found no evidence of supplier collusion, and instead
concluded that the observed price spikes were the inevitable result of
national disasters that severely disrupted refining and transport
operations.49 Despite demagogic and frequently ad hominem
interrogation, Majoras held firm.50 She refused to commit the agency to
use its antitrust law enforcement powers in a futile, expensive attempt to
tame forces entirely beyond the agency’s control.
years working on the Exxon case and saw firsthand the corrosive effects of requiring staff to work
on a matter that everyone involved knew was doomed.
45. This episode is recounted in Muris & Sayyed, supra note 41, at 903–07.
46. One of us (Kovacic) was the FTC’s General Counsel at this time and observed the
congressional moves to delay consideration of the Majoras nomination.
47. The opening and closing of the FTC inquiry are described in Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, FTC Closes Its Investigation of Shell Oils Decision to Close Bakersfield, California,
Refinery (May 25, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2005/05/ftc-closes-itsinvestigation-shell-oils-decision-close [https://perma.cc/2UAC-9VPL].
48. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Releases Report on Its Investigation of Gasoline
Price Manipulation and Post-Katrina Gasoline Price Increases (May 22, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2006/05/ftc-releases-report-its-investigation-gasoline-pricemanipulation [https://perma.cc/96XJ-QSGB]. The actual report may be downloaded at FED. TRADE
COMM’N, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION OF GASOLINE MANIPULATION AND
POST-KATRINA GASOLINE PRICE INCREASES (2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-investigation-gasoline-price-manipulation-and-postkatrina-gasoline-price/060518publicgasolinepricesinvestigationreportfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YA6C-AS92].
49. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 48, at vii–x.
50. See generally Price Gouging: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.,
109th Cong. (2006), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg71812/html/CHRG-109shrg
71812.htm [https://perma.cc/NL59-AJUY] [hereinafter Price Gouging Hearing]. An earlier hearing
in November 2005 involved similar behavior. See Energy Prices CSPAN, (Nov. 9, 2005),
http://www.c-span.org/video/?189831-2/energy-prices [https://perma.cc/CW8S-V26E].
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To be sure, the problem is not unique to gasoline. Elected officials
routinely demand that regulators “do something” when the price of
heating oil, natural gas, electricity, and other important consumer
products rises dramatically. Rather than attribute a price increase to
causes beyond the control of the product’s suppliers, such as a sudden
boost in input costs, elected officials typically insist that wrongful
supplier behavior (e.g., collusion, fraud, price gouging) accounts for the
unwanted event. In these circumstances, the regulator will face intense
pressure to use its powers to address the problem. Intervention (in the
form of an investigation or a case) is faster and easier than attempting to
educate legislators and cabinet officials that the root cause of the market
shock lies elsewhere—and the intervention may actually be
counterproductive.51 Indeed, the failure to intervene may be viewed by
members of Congress as dereliction of duty.52
Caving in to the pressure to intervene will provide momentary relief
to agency leadership, but at a significant long-term institutional cost.
Filing the Exxon case got Congress off of the FTC’s back, but it inflicted
painful long-term harm. By the time the bill comes due, those who were
responsible for the initial decision to intervene will be long gone—and
they will find it easy to blame their successors if anyone bothers to ask.53
A third factor encouraging consumption is miscalculation of the likely
difficulty, costs, and risks of the contemplated intervention. The decision
to launch a case should rest upon a clear-headed understanding of how
hard it will be to gather relevant evidence; to establish the legal

51. Price-gouging legislation provides a particularly clear example. See Steven Mufson, Congress
Tells FTC to Define Price Gouging, WASH. POST (May 6, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/05/AR2006050501626.html
[https://perma.cc/LA8D-A5CW]
(“‘Many economists cringe when they hear politicians talk about price gouging,’ said N. Gregory
Mankiw, an economics professor at Harvard University and former chairman of President Bush’s
Council of Economic Advisers. ‘To economists, the price system is central to how market
economies allocate resources. Sometimes prices need to rise to balance supply and demand, even if
that outcome is politically unpopular.’”); Michael A. Salinger, Give Your Cabdriver a Fat Tip!,
WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115110485824489519
[https://perma.cc/C9ZY-F46B] (“If the public were to ask my advice on the wisdom of price
gouging legislation, however, I would counsel against it. When disasters like Katrina and Rita
occur, prices must go up. The difficulty is that without knowing the details of a disaster, it is
impossible to specify in advance how much prices need to rise. As result, price-gouging
legislation—particularly if penalties are severe and enforcement is aggressive—will pose two
distinct risks. One is that prices will not rise to market-clearing levels and gas stations will run out
of gasoline. As unpleasant as high-priced gasoline is, running out will be even worse. The other is
that gas stations will shut down rather than risk an allegation of price gouging.”).
52. See Price Gouging Hearing, supra note 50 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer) (“I’ll tell you,
we don’t need an FTC like this.”).
53. See Kovacic, supra note 38.
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foundations of the case; to assemble the type and quality of personnel
required for effective implementation; and to manage the risks to the
agency of proceeding. Each of these should be evaluated within the
context of the agency’s overall portfolio of existing commitments. If an
agency does not undertake this analysis, leadership will tend to initiate
matters without a realistic view of what it will take to complete them
successfully.
The IBM monopolization case54 provides a striking example of the
problem. The Department of Justice (DOJ) launched the case on the final
day of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency in January 1969.55 Among other
relief, the DOJ sought to break IBM into several computer companies.56
It quickly became apparent that the case was in trouble.57 The DOJ had
vastly underestimated the doctrinal, evidentiary, and administrative
difficulties of seeking to take apart what was, perhaps, the paramount
exemplar of American technological progress in the post-World War II
era.58 Nor did the DOJ anticipate the scope and ferocity of defense that
IBM and its external advisors would mount to oppose the government.
IBM’s ensemble of exceptional trial lawyers and expert economists
overwhelmed a DOJ prosecution team afflicted with disorganization and
rapid turnover in personnel.59 In 1982, the DOJ abandoned the case,60
54. United States v. IBM Corp., [1961–1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,069
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1969) (complaint alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization).
55. By launching the case on the final day of the Johnson Administration, those responsible
ensured that the successive Administrations (i.e., Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan) would bear all
of the costs of bringing the case to completion.
Similar examples are not hard to find. The Clinton Administration took almost four years to
prepare privacy regulations pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA). Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 Fed. Reg.
82,462 (2000), http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/
prdecember2000all8parts.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8UT-VBVA]. These regulations were issued in the
final month of the Clinton Administration (i.e., on December 28, 2000)—leaving the Bush (43)
Administration to sort out the complexities, and take the political heat.
56. See FRANKLIN M. FISHER ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM 353–68 (1983) (reprinting DOJ’s original complaint and amended
complaint against IBM); The Computer Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly, 93d Cong. 5706–08 (1974) (reprinting the DOJ’s preliminary memorandum on relief).
57. Donald Baker, who served as the DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust from 1976
to 1977, wrote that “[b]y even the mid-1970s, it was clear that the [IBM] case was a relic.” Donald
I. Baker, Government Enforcement of Section Two, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 898, 910 (1986).
58. The history of the IBM case and the DOJ’s missteps in the formulation and litigation of the
matter are recounted in John E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 145 (2000). We also based the statements in this paragraph on interviews that
Kovacic conducted with Edwin Zimmerman, a senior official at the DOJ at the time of the filing of
the IBM case, and Frederic M. Scherer, who served as the DOJ’s chief economic expert on the case.
59. IBM’s successful defense against the DOJ case is reviewed in JAMES B. STEWART, THE
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which had “spanned the terms of five Presidents, nine Attorney
Generals, and seven Assistant Attorney Generals.”61 The trial consumed
700 calendar days, generated a transcript of over 104,000 pages, and
featured 17,000 exhibits.62 In Robert Bork’s phrase, the IBM case was
“the Antitrust Division’s Vietnam.”63
The Exxon and IBM examples make it clear that an agency’s failure to
think carefully in advance about its capability to deliver on a single
major case can be devastating. What happens when agency leadership
ignores these points and chases the Sirens of consumption on a larger
scale? The FTC in the 1970s provides a clear case study of what can go
wrong. As we noted in an earlier Article:
It is one thing to launch a single bet-the-agency case and entirely
another to launch a half-dozen of those cases and an equal
number of significant rulemaking projects simultaneously—let
alone staff each case and rulemaking project so as to maximize
the likelihood of good outcomes across the entire portfolio.64
Despite the obvious risks, that is more or less what the FTC did in the
1970s. Consider a partial list of the agency’s competition matters during
this period:
 Shared monopolization cases involving the country’s eight
leading petroleum refiners (the Exxon case)65 and the four
leading producers of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals;66
 Cases alleging monopolization or attempted monopolization
based on predatory pricing against leading producers in the
bread, coffee, and reconstituted lemon juice sectors;67
PARTNERS 53–113 (1983). Among the stars of the IBM defense team was David Boies, a young
partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore. Years later, Boies headed the litigation trial team in the DOJ’s
successful prosecution in the late 1990s of Microsoft for illegal monopolization of the market for
computer operating systems.
60. In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 687 F.2d 591, 604 (2d Cir. 1982) (ordering the issue of a writ
of mandamus directing district court to dismiss complaint in accordance with stipulation of the
parties).
61. Baker, supra note 57, at 899 n.13.
62. BNA, Post-Mortem on IBM Case Provides Forum for Conflicting Perspectives, 42
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 310–11 (1982).
63. Baker, supra note 57, at 899 n.13 (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978)).
64. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 4.
65. Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453, 456–59 (1981) (complaint alleging agreement to monopolize
and maintenance of a noncompetitive market structure).
66. Kellogg Corp., 99 F.T.C. 8, 11–16 (1982) (complaint alleging maintenance of a highly
concentrated, noncompetitive market structure and shared monopolization).
67. Gen. Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 206–08 (1984) (complaint alleging attempted
monopolization in production and sale of instant coffee); Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280,
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A challenge to the nation’s leading soft-drink bottlers’
longstanding practice of using exclusive territories to
distribute their products;68
 A case alleging attempted monopolization in the chemicals
sector by means of strategic announcements of capacity
expansion;69
 A
case
alleging
monopolization
and
attempted
monopolization against the world’s leading producer of plainpaper photocopiers;70
 A case challenging illegal monopolization and attempted
monopolization against one of the largest U.S. producers of
citrus fruit;71
 A case attacking the American Medical Association for
imposing restrictions on advertising and marketing in the
medical profession;72
 A case designed to make it easier to challenge resale price
maintenance;73
 Two cases challenging the parallel, noncollusive adoption of
facilitating practices by rival producers;74 and
 A case challenging alleged discrimination by the publisher of
airline timetables in its presentation of flight information.75
The overextension of the FTC’s 1970s antitrust program was matched
by an even more astonishing agenda of consumer protection rulemaking

284–85 (1984) (complaint alleging attempted monopolization in the bread sector); Borden, Inc., 92
F.T.C 669, 671–72 (1978) (complaint alleging monopolization and maintenance of a
noncompetitive market structure in production and sale of reconstituted lemon juice), enforcement
granted, 674 F.2d 498, 517 (6th Cir. 1982), modified, 102 F.T.C. 1147 (1983).
68. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), remanded for dismissal, 642 F.2d 1387, 1388 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
69. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 654–55 (1980) (complaint alleging attempted
monopolization).
70. Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 367–68 (1975) (complaint alleging monopolization, attempted
monopolization, and maintenance of a highly concentrated market structure).
71. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 443, 445–49 (1981) (complaint alleging monopolization,
attempted monopolization, and maintenance of a noncompetitive market structure).
72. Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff’d in part, modified in part, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir.
1980), aff’d by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
73. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982), enforcement denied, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir.
1983).
74. Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), enforcement denied, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Boise
Cascade, 91 F.T.C. 1 (1978), enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
75. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 F.T.C. 1 (1976), enforcement denied, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1980).
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proceedings.76 There were almost thirty major rulemaking projects in
progress during this period, including “proposed rules that would have:
imposed disclosures on over-the-counter medicines; required
inspections, disclosures, and warranties on used cars; established
definitions (like ‘natural’) for foods; regulated mobile home warranties;
and banned certain credit practices.”77 And then-FTC Chairman Michael
Pertschuk had announced that, going forward, rulemaking might be
based on public policy grounds, including to “prohibit businesses from
hiring illegal aliens, to prevent companies from cheating on taxes, and to
require companies with repeated environmental violations to place an
environmentalist on their boards.”78 Pertschuk subsequently
acknowledged that he had presided over a rulemaking “frenzy.”79
Even if one boldly assumes that each ambitious decision by the FTC
to undertake each of these matters, when seen in isolation, made good
substantive sense, the full collection completely overwhelmed the FTC’s
institutional capacity to deliver. To add new, difficult initiatives to an
already-crowded agenda without accounting for implementation burdens
was a breathtaking example of administrative malpractice.80
In fairness, the fault for overextension sometimes lies with legislators,
who assign new duties to agencies without considering capability and
capacity. These new responsibilities only rarely come with additional
resources attached. As we have explained in other work, the agency then
faces the choice of either ignoring selected responsibilities or spreading
its resources thin in trying to do it all.81 The first strategy is a form of
regulatory disobedience, and the second is a formula for inevitable
failures in delivery.
76. On the FTC’s consumer protection rulemaking agenda in the 1970s, see William MacLeod et
al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its Limits in Competition Policy, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 951–54 (2005).
77. Id. at 952.
78. Id. at 952–54 (citing TIMOTHY J. MURIS & J. HOWARD BEALES, THE LIMITS OF UNFAIRNESS
UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT 14 (1991)).
79. MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION 54 (1982).
80. Kovacic, supra note 35, at 923 (“One could understand a decision to bring one innovating and
potentially pathbreaking shared monopolization case, but it was improvident to bring two. One
could imagine a decision to bring one or two predatory pricing cases, but it overtaxed the agency’s
capacity to do three at once. To do four significant dominance cases at one time might have been
manageable. To do eight was unwise. Incumbent leadership began new matters without asking
difficult questions about how the agency would bring them to a successful end.”); see also
KOVACIC, supra note 14.
81. Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 9. The Dodd-Frank Act placed the new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in precisely this unenviable position. Id.; Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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In reciting the dangers of overextension, we are not suggesting that
agency leadership should forego consumption and devote all of its
efforts to investment. Consumption, in the form of law enforcement and
rulemaking, is essential to the work of a good regulatory agency. The
willingness to litigate cases and the ability to pursue them to a successful
end are vital to an agency’s credibility, effectiveness, and legitimacy.
Litigated cases set the boundaries of lawful behavior. A regulator that
cannot credibly commit that it will challenge misconduct is quickly
recognized to be a paper tiger.82 Litigation also provides an
indispensable means for obtaining remedies for the victims of
misconduct. Rulemaking is similarly important as a means to correct
problems that pervade entire economic sectors, or appear in multiple
areas of commerce. Finally, establishing a reputation for courageously
taking on hard problems can build internal morale and attract high
quality talent.
Simply stated, a sensible scorecard for agency performance should
consider not just whether cases or rulemaking are launched, but when
and how they land.83 The issue is not whether agency leadership aims at
ambitious targets or succeeds in all of its endeavors. A healthy dose of
ambition is a valuable spur to policy success.84 We do not regard failure,
in itself, as a sign of bad agency decision making.85 There is a world of
difference between accepting a calculated risk and taking a reckless
gamble, by proceeding with a difficult project without a clear
assessment, ex ante, of the risks and the institution’s ability to address
them.
The critical question is whether the agency has a disciplined process
82. Of course, litigation does not require actually taking defendants to trial. As we noted in an
earlier Article, “taking a case to trial and losing doesn’t help the agency’s brand—and successful
agencies don’t need to take their cases to trial to accomplish their regulatory objectives.” Hyman &
Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 9, at 1473 n.119.
83. In some instances, the scorecard does include outcomes. When the website for Obamacare
(healthcare.gov) failed on launch, no amount of spinning could obscure the problem. The continuing
inability of the Veterans Administration to address its waiting lists, other than by outright
falsification of the data, provides another example of the phenomenon.
84. As we describe below in Part III, the FTC’s health care program is unmistakably ambitious
and difficult. Other FTC policy successes, such as the implementation of the agency’s Do Not Call
Rule for telemarketing, were similarly ambitious and required the agency to confront formidable
obstacles involving legal doctrine, political opposition, and program implementation. See MacLeod
et al., supra note 76 (describing design and promulgation of the Do Not Call Rule).
85. FTC Commissioner Ohlhausen has noted that “a leading competition agency like the FTC
must have the courage to fail from time-to-time.” Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, How to Measure Success: Agency Design and the FTC at 100, at 11 (Nov. 6, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/597191/141106ftcat100fall
forum.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT35-8FUP].
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to assess, before the start of every new initiative, whether it has the
“ability to match means to ends.”86 In particular, does the agency make
investments that give it a reasonable prospect of success in carrying out
ambitious programs? The challenge is to harness the personal ambition
and zeal of agency leaders in the service of effective policy
implementation.87
III.

A CASE STUDY OF BALANCED INVESTMENT AND
CONSUMPTION

The FTC’s health care portfolio shows the benefits of a balanced
approach to investment and consumption. Since the 1970s, the FTC has
devoted considerable effort to health care, beginning with a major case
challenging restrictions on advertising in the medical profession,88 and
then going on from there to bring cases involving every aspect of the
health care delivery system.89 In health care, the FTC has batted through
its entire rotation of policy tools, including numerous cases, rulemaking,
advisory opinions, hearings, and competition advocacy.90 More than any
other program, the health care program has paid the rent for the FTC’s
charter as a competition authority.
Consider just a few recent accomplishments. Over the past three
years, the FTC has achieved victories in three Supreme Court cases
involving health care. In North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners v. FTC,91 the Supreme Court held that absent active
supervision, antitrust scrutiny of the actions of a state licensing board
dominated by active market participants was proper.92 In FTC v. Phoebe

86. See KING & CREWE, supra note 6, at 419.
87. SCHUCK, supra note 5, at 129 (“What matters, or should matter, to the citizenry is the actual
performance of officially administered programs on the ground, yet this performance may have little
or nothing to do with how publicly spirited they are. Indeed, just as speed is a bad thing if one is
going in the wrong direction, so officials’ zeal may in some situations actually exacerbate program
failure.”).
88. Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), modified and enforced, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
89. John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Federal Trade Commission and the Professions: A Quarter Century
of Accomplishment and Some New Challenges, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 997 (2005).
90. See Jonathan Nuechterlein, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Administrative
Law Review Annual Symposium 3–6 (Mar. 20, 2015) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/632081/150320adminlawreview.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE5B-FYU4] (describing
FTC’s reliance on the full portfolio of its policy tools in development of its modern health care
program); Gavil, supra note 23, at 1908–09 (same); Ohlhausen, supra note 10, at 8–11 (same).
91. __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
92. See generally id.
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Putney Health System,93 the Court said that state action immunity should
be read narrowly, and reiterated the requirement that states must clearly
articulate their purpose to suppress competition.94 In FTC v. Actavis,95
the Court said the rule of reason applies to “reverse payments” in the
pharmaceutical sector, and rejected a more permissive “scope of the
patent” test.96
All three victories were built on a foundation of decades of hard
work.97 These high-profile cases were part of a larger litigation program
that has seen the FTC successfully challenge hospital mergers (after
more than a decade of losses);98 dramatically reduce abuse of the HatchWaxman Act;99 attack horizontal restraints involving health care
providers;100 and oppose overreaching forms of occupational licensing
and other restrictions on competition.101 In addition to these litigation
programs, the FTC has engaged in a large number of advocacy
initiatives, encouraging other government entities to account for the
competitive impact of statutes and regulations.102
93. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013).
94. See generally id.
95. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
96. Id. at 2237–38.
97. Nuechterlein, supra note 90, at 1–2 (“I mention these victories not out of a misplaced sense of
triumphalism, but because each of the three cases tells a compelling back story about what makes
the FTC successful as a competition authority. Each of the three arose from a multi-decade FTC
initiative focusing on a difficult and discrete area of competition policy. And each of those
initiatives was built on a solid foundation of strong bipartisan support and close coordination among
the FTC’s litigators, economists, and policy analysts.”); Ohlhausen, supra note 10, at 8–11
(describing how FTC policy research in early 2000s, including work of the FTC’s State Action Task
Force, set the foundation for litigation success in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners
v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015)).
98. Since 2000, the FTC’s merger enforcement program in the hospital sector has achieved
litigated victories in the courts of appeals in two cases—St. Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc.
v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015), and ProMedica v. FTC, 749 F.3d
559 (6th Cir. 2014)—and has resulted in the abandonment of proposed mergers in two others. In
another case (In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 375 (2007)) the FTC
issued an opinion finding that a consummated merger had violated section 7 of the Clayton Act,
though the remedy ultimately achieved in the case is generally regarded as a disappointment. These
accomplishments are reviewed in Nuechterlein, supra note 90, at 6.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012); see also Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
100. N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
101. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101; S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455
F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 2006).
102. On the FTC’s advocacy program, see James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005); Andrew I. Gavil & Tara Isa
Koslov, A Flexible Health Care Workforce Requires a Flexible Regulatory Environment:
Promoting Health Care Competition Through Regulatory Reform, 91 WASH. L. REV. 147 (2016);
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 100 Is the New 30: Recommendations for the FTC’s Next 100 Years, 21
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These successes were not an accident, or the result of dumb luck.
Instead, the FTC (a) identified health care as a major priority; (b)
invested substantial resources to build capability and capacity in the
area; and (c) conducted periodic ex post evaluations to identify areas of
useful refinement.103 We briefly address each of these steps below.
A.

Setting Goals and Designing a Strategy to Achieve Them

Before the 1970s, the FTC was a reactive agency, responding to
complaints from consumers and legislators. During this period, health
care was not a major priority for the agency. Health care became a
priority because the FTC decided to engage in strategic planning. The
strategic planning process was driven by the FTC’s desire to identify
areas of the economy where it could make a useful and distinctive
contribution, thereby delivering major benefits to consumers. Strategic
planning made it clear that health care was a “target-rich” environment
for the FTC.
Why did the FTC decide to engage in strategic planning, rather than
allow its workload and priorities to be driven by the inbox of consumer
complaints? The FTC adopted strategic planning because of external
pressure and internal changes. External commentators and legislators
demanded the FTC do a better job in setting priorities, including
focusing on difficult and unsettled areas of competition law where the
FTC’s unique array of policy-making instruments could make a
difference.104 Legislators in the early 1970s also identified the rising cost
of medical services as a worthy subject for the FTC’s attention.105 These
demands established the framework within which the FTC shaped its
competition-policy agenda.
The internal changes were less visible, but equally significant. During
the 1970s, the Commission recruited talented managers and supporting
personnel to spot potential high-value applications of the agency’s
competition powers. Internal analysis and research made it clear that a
greater dedication of resources to health care would significantly
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2014) (calling FTC’s competition advocacy role a “tool of great
importance”).
103. Nuechterlein, supra note 90, at 7 (in targeting health care, “the Commission identified a
competition policy problem, closely analyzed it over many years with all the investigatory tools at
its disposal, and brought a series of enforcement actions to protect consumers from anticompetitive
practices”).
104. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 4 (discussing criticism of the FTC by the American Bar
Association’s Commission to Study the FTC, and by Congress).
105. Kovacic, supra note 39, at 639–40.
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improve consumer welfare.106 The combination of these elements caused
agency leadership to prioritize health care.
B.

Capability and Capacity Enhancements

Health care promised to be a difficult and risky area of endeavor for
the FTC. The FTC was taking on a powerful industry, and intervening in
a sector of the economy where the use of competition policy was
extremely controversial.107 Although the FTC went “looking for
trouble,” it did so in a way that gave it a fighting chance to succeed.
More specifically, the FTC invested heavily in health policy R&D.108
These efforts included influential studies of the impact of advertising
restrictions on health care products and services;109 a major study of the
impact of entry by generic producers on the pricing of pharmaceutical
products;110 and a retrospective examination of the impact of hospital
mergers.111 These research projects set the foundation for the FTC’s
enforcement efforts, including the hospital merger litigation program of
the past decade.112
The FTC also used hearings, seminars, and workshops to gather
information.113 Among other results, these proceedings led to the

106. The authors are grateful to Daniel C. Schwartz for sharing his experiences about the design
of the FTC’s modern health care program in the 1970s. Schwartz served as a Deputy Director for
the FTC’s Bureau of Competition and played a central role in the formulation of the new program.
See Kovacic, supra note 39; FTC Moves to Block Exxon Bid, CHI. TRIB. (July 28, 1979),
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/07/28/page/202/article/ftc-moves-to-block-exxon-bid
[https://perma.cc/8T28-VGYC].
107. See Kovacic, supra note 25.
108. See Gavil, supra note 23, at 1908–11 (documenting FTC’s investment in policy research and
related learning about health care).
109. See RONALD S. BOND ET AL., BUREAU OF ECON., FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON EFFECTS OF RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL
PRACTICE IN THE PROFESSIONS: THE CASE OF OPTOMETRY (1980), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/effects-restrictions-advertising-and-commercial-practiceprofessions-case-optometry/198009optometry.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LJP-TLPM].
110. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-priorpatent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN8E-HB2L]. On the FTC’s
research program regarding reverse payment agreements in the pharmaceutical sector, see
Ohlhausen, supra note 85.
111. Orley Ashenfelter et al., Retrospective Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS.
5 (2011).
112. Ronan P. Harty, Interview with Edith Ramirez, Chairperson, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
THRESHOLD, Spring 2014, at 1, 6–7 (2014); Nuechterlein, supra note 90; Ohlhausen, supra note 85,
at 8–9.
113. For example, in 2003, the FTC and DOJ jointly held over twenty days of hearings on
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publication of formative reports dealing with competition in health
care114 and the state action doctrine.115 The state action project, in turn,
set in motion a litigation program from which North Carolina State
Board of Dental Examiners is the most recent output. Finally, the FTC
and DOJ jointly issued guidelines on antitrust relevant behavior in the
health care sector.116
C.

Retrospective Evaluation

Every year, competition agency officials make dozens of
presentations and speeches. These presentations and speeches invariably
include some version of the observation, “we’ve been very busy.”
Although we have attended hundreds of these meetings, never once has a
member of the audience responded, “but have you been very effective?”
Of course, some level of activity is important for an agency to build
capability, credibility, and legitimacy.117 However, to treat activity levels
as the primary or exclusive measure of performance avoids the equally
important issue of effectiveness.
To decide whether a program actually worked, ex post evaluation is
necessary.118 Lots of government programs fail.119 An agency that
routinely conducts ex post evaluation can identify what has worked well
and what needs to be improved. Ex post evaluation is a vital quality
control device, and it should be a core feature of the life cycle of
policymaking.120
Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care. Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10,
at 775.
114. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-healthcare-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-justice/040723
healthcarerpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KBJ-7XWF].
115. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE (2003),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/report-state-action-taskforce/stateactionreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/VYS7-GN8V].
116. On the importance of agency guidelines as policy making tools, see Hillary Greene, Agency
Character and the Character of Agency Guidelines: An Historical and Institutional Perspective, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 1039 (2005).
117. William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies Signal Quality,
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 247–48 (2015) (discussing importance of sustaining a minimum
critical mass of activity).
118. See supra note 98.
119. See SCHUCK, supra note 5.
120. We are not suggesting that an agency should or must undertake a resource intensive
examination of the effects for each matter it undertakes. For many matters, it is possible, at
relatively low cost, to perform a “quick and dirty” comparison between the assumptions and
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Beginning in the late 1970s, the FTC developed a path-breaking
program to examine the effects of closed competition matters.121 The
program began with an assessment of a monopolization case and various
vertical restraints matters. In the early 2000s, the program was extended
to hospital mergers. The hospital merger retrospective sought to
determine the consequences of various hospital mergers that the FTC
had unsuccessfully challenged. The results were vital to the success of a
renewed hospital merger enforcement program, which began with a case
against Evanston Hospital122 in the mid-2000s, and has since resulted in
a string of successes.123
The FTC’s experience with health care makes it clear that it is
possible for public agency leadership to do a better job balancing
consumption against investment. Part IV turns to some concrete steps
that might help other agencies—and the FTC, in dealing with its nonhealth care portfolio—to do just that.
IV.

STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN
CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT

The conflict between consumption and investment may be a policy
perennial, but it does not follow that there is nothing that can be done to
tip the balance a bit more in favor of the latter. Following Professor
James Q. Wilson, we propose “a few modest suggestions that may make
a small difference.”124 These steps do not depend on agency leadership
suddenly deciding to “do the right thing.”
A.

Create a Pro-Investment Norm

Our most general suggestion is the promotion of a norm that
encourages agency leadership to make adequate investments in
institutional capability. At conferences and in other public settings,
agency leaders are invariably asked to discuss the cases they have

expectations that led the agency to intervene, and the actual results achieved. The larger the
commitment of resources, the more important it is for the agency to evaluate whether its actions are
having the intended effects.
121. William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition
Authorities, 31 J. CORP. L. 503 (2006).
122. In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 375 (2007).
123. Kovacic, supra note 121 at 524–26; Nuechterlein, supra note 90, at 4–5; see also supra note
98.
124. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
DO IT 369 (1989).
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already launched, and their plans for initiating new cases. Agency
leaders are happy to wax poetic on such subjects—but we should
demand that they do more than brag about consumption. Agency leaders
should be cross-examined about the steps they are taking to make their
agencies better off in the future. Concrete questions might include:
 What investments are you making to enhance the capability
of your agency?
 What are you doing to build your agency’s knowledge about
the commercial settings that it regulates?
 How many resources are you spending to build better
networks with your fellow regulatory institutions, both at
home and abroad?
 What steps are you taking to evaluate the results of past
interventions?
 How should we measure your success in these areas?
If agency leadership knows they will have to answer these questions,
they will have an incentive to proactively address (and defend) the
balance they have struck between consumption and investment.
We realize that norms are fragile. Yet, the FTC’s modern experience
provides a striking example of how a conscious, sustained emphasis by
agency leaders on policy R&D can create a strong institutional
commitment to do things a certain way, even though the specific
mandates of the law do not require such behavior. These norms can
become an integral element of the language and practice of the agency.
In her opening remarks at an FTC workshop in 2014 on competition in
health care, FTC Chairperson Edith Ramirez observed that “in an
industry such as health care, which is undergoing significant and rapid
evolution, we must also invest our resources to understand and anticipate
change.”125 Ramirez is the latest in a long line of FTC chairs and senior
officials who have embraced a pro-investment norm.126 As the custom
continues and becomes deeply ingrained in the agency’s culture over
time, it becomes more difficult and costly for future leaders to abandon
it.

125. Edith Ramirez, Chairperson, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Examining
Health Care Competition Workshop 5, 6 (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_events/200361/transcriptmar20.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QDH-TAEE].
126. See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10 (displaying the shared vision of Robert
Pitofsky, who chaired the FTC from 1995 to 2001, and Timothy Muris, who chaired the FTC from
2001 to 2004). The theme of investment as a predicate for policy success has figured prominently in
the work of Maureen Ohlhausen, who directed the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning and now serves
on the Commission. Ohlhausen, supra note 10; Ohlhausen, supra note 85.
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Currently, agencies publicly report (and trumpet the successes of)
their enforcement efforts, but their investment efforts are invisible. To
redress this disparity, each agency should have to annually report its
investments in capability and capacity, and explain how these
investments will support the agency’s anticipated substantive programs.
Just as a public company reports its R&D budget to potential investors
and analysts, each agency should specify its policy R&D budget.
Of course, we do not believe that each agency should spend a fixed
percentage of its overall budget on policy R&D, nor do we believe that
every dollar of policy R&D investment is of equal value. And we
anticipate no shortage of efforts to “game” the reporting requirements by
reporting inflated investments in policy R&D. Still, the process of
preparing an investment budget should force agency personnel to
examine whether they are doing enough to set a sound foundation for the
future.
C.

Setting Priorities and Approving Projects

We have both been in academics long enough to see serial rounds of
strategic planning by our respective institutions. The process involves an
endless series of meetings, culminating in the creation of meaningless
mission statements, backed up by hundreds of pages of boilerplate.
Lather, rinse, repeat.
We are hesitant to recommend anything that would force others to go
through the same process. But agencies will either set their own
priorities internally, or their priorities will be imposed on them by
outsiders. Since agency leadership values autonomy, they should be
willing to take steps that lower the likelihood outsiders will seize control
of the policy agenda. Accordingly, agencies should annually identify and
publicize their priorities. As with the investment budget, the process may
encourage agency personnel (and outsiders) to consider what the agency
is doing—and whether it is worth continuing down the same path.
The agency’s process for project approval should involve a similar set
of calculations. Unless the agency has a systematic process for deciding
whether to initiate a new investigation, case, or rulemaking project, there
will be little predictability or rationality in the results. And saying “this
is the Chairman’s pet project” is not a sufficient reason for committing
public resources to a project, especially when the Chairman will not be
around to bear the consequences of that decision. Before green-lighting a
project, agencies should be able to answer the following questions:
 What do we expect to gain if the project succeeds—doctrinal
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results, economic impact, enhancement of institutional
reputation and capability?
 What are the risks—doctrinal barriers, political backlash that
the project will arouse, reputational costs if the project fails?
 Who will do the project—is the team to which the project will
be assigned equal to the task?
 How much will it cost, and what projects must we forego if
this one goes ahead?
 How does the project fit within our existing portfolio of
commitments?
 How long will it take to accomplish?
 How will we know whether it worked as we hoped?127
Of course, there will often be difficulty in giving confident answers to
these questions, and genuine uncertainty has accompanied many a
successful project. But, a rigorous effort to answer these questions
increases one’s confidence that the agency has the means to deliver, and
is not engaged in a snipe/snark/shark hunt.128
D.

Ex Post Evaluation

As described above, a routine program of ex post evaluation provides
a valuable feedback mechanism that will allow the agency to assess
whether it has properly matched commitments with capabilities. In
comparing expectations ex ante to outcomes ex post, the agency should
obtain a better sense of how to structure future projects, and how to
increase the prospects for future success. A habit of ex post review also
deters incumbent leaders from launching new projects without
considering potential long-term negative externalities.129
127. This framework is inspired by the prioritization principles adopted by the United Kingdom’s
Office of Fair Trading and continued by its successor, the Competition and Markets Authority.
KOVACIC, supra note 14; Kovacic, supra note 11, at 8–10.
128. A snipe hunt is an impossible task. A snark hunt can end very badly for those involved if the
snark turns out to be a Boojum. LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK (1876). And, a
shark hunt may require a bigger boat. See JAWS (Universal Pictures 1975) (“You’re gonna need a
bigger boat.”).
129. See KING & CREWE, supra note 6, at 358 (“There would be a lot to be said for encouraging –
and if necessary, permitting – both the National Audit Office and the select committees of the
House of Commons to assess how well government initiatives were continuing to achieve their
declared purposes after, say, five, ten or twenty years. . . . Those bodies might even be encouraged
to identify and then either to applaud or to chastise those ministers who had been principally
responsible for launching the initiatives in the first place. The thought of possibly being publicly
chastised several years later, but still well within their own lifetime, might – who knows? – give
over-hasty and overambitious ministers pause. It might even cause them to ask, before or at the
moment of decision, ‘How will that look in ten years’ time?’”).
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V.

A FEW COMPLICATIONS

A.

Striking the Proper Balance

Although we have been quite critical of consumption, we are not
suggesting that all consumption is bad. Similarly, although we have
praised investment, we are not claiming that all investment is good. The
key is to strike the proper balance between these two priorities. To date,
the balance has been systematically skewed in favor of consumption. We
will not be able to fix that problem until it is recognized as a problem.
After that, we will have to create the necessary incentives for agency
leadership to “do the right thing.” That approach is far more likely to
lead to good results than any of the alternative strategies; as one of us
noted in an earlier Article:
[I]f you get the incentives right, most of the big problems will
take care of themselves, leaving a far smaller and more tractable
set of problems to be addressed through regulation, litigation,
and benign neglect. But, if you don’t get the incentives right, no
amount of speeches, op-eds, law review articles, whining and
hectoring, moral preening, regulatory oversight, legislation,
lawsuits, or lectures about fairness and justice can take their
place. Reformers should accordingly focus on getting the
incentives right—and legislation that does not address the
underlying incentive problem is not, in fact, “reform,” no matter
what else it may accomplish.130
B.

Does It Matter Whether Agency Leadership Is a Plank-Owner or a
Successor-in-Interest?

Departments, agencies, bureaus, and commissions are periodically
created from scratch, but most agency leaders inherit the job from
someone else. The first agency leader is the equivalent of a plank-owner,
with tremendous power to shape the nature of the agency, its personnel,
and its priorities.131 Subsequent leaders are successors-in-interest, who
step into the shoes of their predecessors. As such, they have more
limited ability to reshape the agency in their image. That said, if prior
leadership has made good investment decisions, the agency will be in
130. David A. Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like Everywhere
Else, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 370, 387 (2010).
131. Plank Owners, U.S. NAVY, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=180
[https://perma.cc/Q2F8-L4CH] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016) (“A ‘plank owner’ is an individual who
was a member of the crew of a ship when that ship was placed in commission.”).
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better shape—and better able to withstand the effects of excessive
consumption by the latest agency head. But, regardless of whether the
agency head is a plank-owner or a successor-in-interest, they will each
end up making a regular series of consumption versus investment
decisions—and it is those decisions with which we are concerned. Thus,
the dynamics we describe are not affected by whether agency leadership
are plank-owners or successors-in-interest.
C.

Agency Leadership Versus Agency Personnel

We have presented a stylized example of a governmental agency, in
which agency leadership always (or almost always) gets its way. That is
obviously an oversimplification. Agency leadership may be short-term,
but most agencies are full of “WeBes,” who have their own perspective
and priorities.132 The key question—to which the answer is likely to be
agency- and leader-specific—is whether agency leadership must consult
with the WeBes about consumption versus investment decisions—and
who gets the last word on the subject. As always, attention to
institutional detail is critical before drawing definitive conclusions.133
D.

Operationalizing the Framework

In the abstract, investment is hard to argue with. Everyone knows
Aesop’s fable of the ant and the grasshopper—and the moral (to work
today is to eat tomorrow) is hard to argue with. But, “invest more” is
spectacularly unhelpful advice. “Build capability and capacity” is
sufficiently vague and open ended that almost anything might qualify.
Similarly, “consume less” means that the agency will not be as visible—
making it a less credible (and less faithful) enforcer of its statutory
mandate. There are political perils with consuming too aggressively—
but there are perils with withdrawing from the field and leaving it
unregulated. Finally, people strive to become agency leaders because
they want to advance the goals of that agency—and bringing cases and
132. Michael Grunwald, Too Good For Government, TIME (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/08/30/too-good-for-government/
[https://perma.cc/43H2-EBBJ]
(describing travails of an agency head who tried to transform her agency by devising “a secret
Operation Cupcake to try to fire the laggards, but the civil-service cupcakes knew political
appointees come and go. They called themselves WeBes, as in We be here, you be gone”). The
problem is not unique to the federal government. See JAMES PAYNE, ADVICE TO A NEW CHILD
SERVICES LEADER (2011), http://www.issuelab.org/resource/advice_to_a_new_child_services_
leader [https://perma.cc/984D-JZRH] (“[A]lways be mindful of the ‘WeBes’– We Be here before
you and We Be here after you!”).
133. See SCHUCK, supra note 5; WILSON, supra note 124.
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initiating rulemaking allow them to do that. Investing in capability and
capacity doesn’t result in favorable press coverage for a good reason—it
is boring, and often unproductive. And some forms of consumption
actually constitute investment because they allow the agency to train its
personnel—and create the precedents the agency can then rely on to
advance its objectives on a broader plane.134
We agree with these points—but the problem of excessive
consumption is sufficiently pervasive that it demands our attention.
Simply stated, we are not opposed to the building of skyscrapers by
agency leaders with an edifice complex—we just want to ensure that
those skyscrapers are built on a solid foundation.
CONCLUSION
Public agency leadership faces a recurring choice between
consumption and investment. Several factors encourage agency
leadership to favor consumption over investment. Predictably enough,
this dynamic creates serious problems, including a mismatch between
agency commitments (made in time t0) and the agency’s (in)ability to
deliver good results (which does not become apparent until time tn).
In this Article, we make the case that greater attention should be paid
to whether agency leadership is investing, rather than consuming. We
envision a strong investment program as a crucial ingredient for
regulatory agency consumption that improves the well-being of
consumers. More generally, adequate investment supplies the foundation
for an effective enforcement agency—and we should start treating it as
such. If we want agency leadership to plant trees, we need to make it in
their interest to do so. Otherwise, instead of behaving like Johnny
Appleseed, agency leaders will continue to follow the Sirens of
consumption.

134. For example, the FTC’s prosecution of a case involving concerted refusal to deal by dentists
in Indiana helped lay the foundation for modern jurisprudence on the rule of reason. See Kovacic,
supra note 37 (“Consider the FTC’s case in Indiana Federation of Dentists (IFD). An index of
importance that focused on the total volume of commerce affected probably would not give much
weight to a challenge to a concerted refusal by dentists in Indiana to provide the x-rays of their
patients to insurers. In that sense, IFD is a comparatively insignificant matter—a small case.
Evaluated by its effect on doctrine, the small case made big law. The Supreme Court’s decision in
IFD helped shape modern jurisprudence governing the rule of reason and the proof of
anticompetitive effects. Among other results, IFD provided a doctrinal foundation for the Justice
Department’s prosecution of Microsoft.”).

